Designing Against Terror, Violence and Crime By Randall Atlas Ph.D., AIA The attacks on the World trade Center and the Pentagon, the Oklahoma City
bombing, the World Trade Center Bombing, the firebombing in the New York subway,
the toxic gas attack in Japan's subway, the derailment of the Amtrak Train in
the Arizona desert, are now forever etched as terrorism landmarks in our memory.
Terrorism represents a real threat for our society and to our peace of mind.
The face of terrorism is undergoing systemic changes as the level of sophistication
of terrorists increase with the availability of knowledge and materials to carry
out these acts of violence.
Knowledge about bombs and terror has proliferated to a point that virtually
any terrorist or criminal can find out the information to build a pipe bomb
to a nuclear bomb, or developing killer toxins to carry out their particular
misgivings.Timothy McViegh, who blew up the Oklahoma City Courthouse, stated
in an interview shortly after his arrest, that he picked the courthouse because
'it was more architecturally vulnerable". Who would have ever thought that a
rental truck and a load of manure could be so deadly? What can the public and
government agencies do to be effective in diminishing the threats and losses
to persons, information, and property? How do you reduce the opportunity and
fear of crime in the built environment and improve the quality of life: Crime
Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). This paper will address how
to reduce the threats and vulnerabilities in the built environment by changing
how we design and use space.
The targets of terrorism in the future will be cities, utility companies,
government buildings or agencies, technology companies, and high profile corporate
entities. New Technology has made the infrastructure of America more vulnerable
to sabotage, especially disruption of communications and information systems,
which have the same net result as a bomb going off.
On September 11, 2001 it took but a few moments to breach the airport security
systems, and America's confidence in flying the friendly skies was shattered.
The 911 Tragedy was the combined failure of intelligence (information,
and at least four attempts to deny access of the hijackers into the United States
by U.S. Customs), the failure of security systems and protocol, and by
failure of training of security personnel. The airport security systems,
overseen by the Federal Aviation Authority and the security industry, has ignored
years of known and obvious defects. For how could passengers pass through security
screening, X-ray equipment, ID checks and then breach the cockpit doors? The
terrorists did not need to beat the airport security system, but rather took
advantage of the system as it existed. The terrorists probably watched screeners
and tested the security to see what they could get away with. Flight protocol
called for pilots to cooperate with hijackers if the lives of passengers or
crew were at stake. That might have allowed terrorists to gain easy entry to
the cockpit, and do something that none of the pilots expected: fly the jets,
and then deliberately crash the jets. What ended is horrific acts of terror
started with ordinary breaches of security and street level crimes.
Increased security from now on will be expensive, inconvenient, and time consuming.
For example,the cockpit doors were designed to be broken relatively easy in
the event of an accident. But, now pilots see the doors as the last line of
defense, and must be strengthened to protect the flight crew. On a recent flight
to Australia, I observed the flight attendants had blocked the isles with the
food carts to prevent persons from moving between the class sections and gaining
access to the cockpit. On another flight I was forced to take off my shoes to
go through weapon screening barefoot! Americans will lose the inexpensive and
fast flying service they were accustomed too. No system can prevent all breaches,
but a comprehensive and consistent approach will empower the security systems
ability to catch potential criminals and terrorists with much greater certainty.
The federal government is now taking control over the thousands of airport screeners
where they will be given background checks, drug tested, and consistent level
of training.
Persons watching the horror live on TV were surprised and shocked that the
World Trade Center buildings collapsed. The Towers, built in 1972-73 were 110
stories tall, and experienced progressive collapses similar to that caused by
an explosion to the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma in 1995. The two plane
crashes into the Towers destroyed columns and floors on several stories which
transferred excessive loads to the remaining structural columns. Explosions
and raging fire weakened the remaining columns, which were already overloaded.
The original design had provided for the structural strength to withstand a
Boeing 707, which was a smaller plane and a much lower fuel capacity. The design
of the Towers was substantial enough to withstand the impact of the jets without
toppling instantly. Even with huge gaping holes, the remaining columns were
strong enough to hold up the structure long enough for 20,000 people to escape.
The jet fuel released a much higher heat than paper or plastic burning, which
might be the contents of a normal office fire. Fire suppression systems in the
Towers did not include foam sprinklers that could deal with the jet fuel fires.
Both of the crashed jets were fully fueled for transcontinental flights, making
them "flying bombs".
Fireproofed steel loses half its strength when it reaches 1100 degrees F,
and fails rapidly after 1600 degrees F. The temperatures inside the building
were estimated to be over 2000 degrees. The steel columns, weakened by fire,
finally buckled, and the floors they supported dropped on top of each other
in a "pancaking" action. Each falling floor overburdened the columns and floor
below, causing the buildings to tear themselves down. ( Architectural Record
October , 2001. Pp. 24-26). Designers agree that few structures short of a missile
silo, no matter what their height, can endure such aggressive attacks.
Environmental design might not have been able to prevent to tragic events
of September 11, but the design of our public and private spaces does relate
to safety and security through planning for: crowd behavior in high-density
environments; wayfinding and design of escape routes; placement and type of
building security features; design for high risk environments; and effective
design of the built environment providing the building users with less stress,
less confusion, and less opportunity to be a victim of a crime. (Environmental
Design Technical Group News, September 2001)
Yet, with all of the catastrophic effects of terrorism in the past, and the
huge potential for damage in the future, acts of terrorism are relatively infrequent.
The overall damage of these horrific acts of terror to society is less than
loss of life and property from ordinary street crime. The societal damage from
guns and drugs far exceeds the damage from any bomb. But the perceived threat
is much greater from terrorism than say getting robbed.
As the roles of the security designer and the architect gets redefined for
the 21st century, the first step in designing against crime and terrorism is
to assess the threats and vulnerabilities. The initial step is to evaluate the
tangible and intangible assets that are to be protected. Usually the assets
of our buildings are (PIP), PEOPLE (users and employees), INFORMATION, and PROPERTY.
The threats are the potential for losses of the assets. The vulnerabilities
are the weaknesses, shortcomings, or perception of risk of attack by the actuality
of crime or terrorism. But, is there really a difference designing against terrorism
or designing against crime and workplace violence?
What is the chance or likelihood that our private or public sector buildings
would be a victim of an act of terrorism? The perceived level of threat is much
greater than the actuality. The incidence of terrorism in the United States
is still extremely low. The probability of becoming a victim of a robbery, burglary,
auto theft, assault , or murder has affected how most of us live our lives on
a day to day basis.
An example of increased awareness is the threat of workplace violence. Workplace
violence is closely related to terrorism in its level of predictability. Yet,
with all of the assaults at the post office, or office buildings, the frequency
is increasing at an alarming rate. The threat is just waiting for an opportunity
to surface with the next job termination or downsizing. Bombings are one of
the most traditional ways to commit acts of terrorism. Knowing the tools of
the terrorist helps identify where security needs to be strengthened. Acts of
terrorism can also manifest themselves in arson, skyjacking, kidnapping, assassination,
hostage taking, armed assaults, and bio-chemical attacks. ( Security Watch,
Bureau of Business Practice Newsletter,Oct. 2001, p.4)
The Governor of Florida has increased security at the capital for his offices.
What was once a receptionist, Is now a guard. The heightened security comes
as state legislators prepare for an emergency session to slash $1.3 billion
from Florida's budget. Governor Bush pledged to ask lawmakers for money to beef
up security in areas such as bio-terrorism, training for emergency workers,
physical security, and tightening rules that allow foreigners to obtain state
driver's licenses.
The threat of terrorism is more marketable for social change than ordinary
street crime. For decades efforts have been made to have a national security
code, or security ordinances as part of state or national building codes. These
efforts have fallen on deaf ears. Efforts to have criminals serve their actual
sentence, or truth in sentencing, has collapsed under the weight of prison overcrowding
and construction and budget moratoriums. Terrorism has been the vehicle for
change, in an otherwise stuck universe of crime prevention. For example, President
Clinton in June of 1995 mandated basic standard of security for all federal
facilities. The mandate states that each federal building shall be upgraded
to the minimum security standards recommended for its audited security level
by the Department of Justice. President Bush in November 2001 signed a bill
federalizing airport security screeners and ant-terrorism legislation that empowers
law enforcement and the military to take preventative actions.
Prior to the U.S. Marshals Service conducting a vulnerability assessment,
there was no government wide standards for security at federal buildings. The
Marshals Service building security study developed 52 standards, primarily covering
perimeter security, entry security, interior security, and security technology
planning. Each federal building was rated within the five levels, with level
I being minimum security and level V being a defense plant or nuclear facility.
Most courthouses with multi-tenant , multi-story building are considered level
IV and require shatter resistant glass, controlled parking, 24 hour CCTV monitoring
and videotaping, x ray weapon and package screening, and a photo identification
system.
The creation of basic minimum security standards is needed, and the federal
government has now established a minimum standard of care for federal buildings.
In the private sector, the American Society of testing materials Premise's Liability
Committee was disbanded by lobbying pressures for developing minimum security
guidelines for multi-tenant residential housing environments. Presently, there
is an effort to resurrect the effort with the National Fire Protection Association.
The NFPA regulates fire protection and life safety requirements and security
is definitely considered part of a life safety issue. I am now part of the NFPA
Premises Liability Committee charged with developing occupant based security
standards.
The threat of premises liability litigation is what has driven the major organizations
from Hotel and Motels Associations, shopping center associations, retail store
association, and builder associations to try and block all efforts of developing
minimum standards. A legal and physical benchmark puts essentially, all of corporate
America on notice to make their buildings safe against crime, not just safe
against the remote occurrence of fire. Insurance companies are strongly supporting
standards that they could measure a business against, and reduce their losses
and have less payout. The auto industry created the momentum for reduction of
auto theft by redesigning locking systems, installation of alarm systems, improved
driver training, and redesign of car stereos to resist theft (removable faceplates).
Responsible car owners now realize discounts in their premiums because of the
inclusion of security features and minimum standards.
Designing without security in mind can lead to lawsuits, injuries, and expensive
retrofitting with protection equipment, and the need for additional security
personnel. If not properly planned for and installed, that equipment can distort
important building design functions, add to security personnel costs, and result
in exposed unsightly alarm systems or blocked doors and windows.
Treating security as an afterthought increases the cost and obtrusiveness
of security features when construction is completed. Whether the threat is from
terrorism or street crime, or workplace violence, the increased threat of premises
liability litigation will be the strongest driving elements for change. Where
common sense fails, and building codes obscure, where management executives
overlook, the slap of premises liability is driving building owners and managers
to make the necessary safety and security improvements. Large judgements are
striking fear into the hearts of building owners and managers as much as any
act of terrorism!
The media covered the recent acts of terrorism for weeks with unrelenting
enthusiasm. The personal dramas of terrorist attacks unfolded piece by piece.
However, the secretary raped in a school, or the nurse attacked in a hospital
parking lot barely makes the back page of the local section of the paper. The
commonness and greater frequency of murder, rapes, assaults, and robbery is
only newsworthy if someone famous is involved, or the crime is particularly
heinous. The numbness to the high frequency of street crime does not motivate
our politicians, insurance companies, building and zoning officials, or design
professionals to make change or improve the quality of life. The actuality is
that terrorism is much more marketable for the media to motivate politicians
to create change in the security field, develop standards, and make changes
in our physical environment to resist criminal behavior. Can Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) make a difference
in preventing acts of terrorism? Absolutely! CPTED emphasizes problem seeking
before rushing into problem solving. CPTED starts with the threat and vulnerability
analysis to determine the weakness and potential for attack. Attack from criminal
behavior, or attack from terrorist activity only reflect a change in the level
and types of threats. The process and challenges are the same. CPTED and Defensible
Space planning are a planning process, as compared to fortressing or target
hardening. When designing against crime, workplace violence, or terrorism the
security consultant must resist the rush for quick answers.
What the CPTED process does is ask the questions about :
1) access control; Design professionals can use three basic strategies for security design, also
known as CPTED. They are Natural Access Control, Natural Surveillance, and Territorial
Reinforcement. Each of the strategies can be implemented through three methods:
mechanical, natural, and organized.
1) NATURAL SURVEILLANCE
Surveillance strategies are a design concept directed at keeping
intruders under observation. Organized surveillance strategies include police
and guard patrols. Lighting and CCTV are mechanical strategies for surveillance,
and natural strategies include windows, low landscaping, and raised entrances.
Surveillance strategies are those directed at primarily keeping intruders under
observation. Surveillance strategies are a design concept directed at keeping
intruders under observation. Organized surveillance strategies include police
and guard patrols. Lighting and CCTV are mechanical strategies for surveillance,
and natural strategies include windows, low landscaping, and raised entrances.
Surveillance is the first principle of CPTED. Surveillance is the ability
to look into an area, and the ability to look back out. It can be formal or
informal. Things that inhibit surveillance are overgrown trees and shrubs, block
walls and poor lighting. Surveillance strategies are aimed primarily at keeping
intruders under observation and undesirable behavior under control. To improve
surveillance, trim trees and shrubs, use fencing appropriately and utilize proper
lighting techniques.
Placing eyes on the street was an idea that Jane Jacob's discovered during
her work in New York's Greenwich Village. Placing legitimate eyes on the street,
or capable guardians, can help to make a place unattractive to offenders, thus,
preventing it from becoming a preference for them to commit crime. This can
be accomplished by the proper placement of windows, adequate lighting, and removing
obstructions to enhance sightlines.
Any architectural design that enhances the chance that a potential offender
will be, or might be, seen is a form of natural surveillance. Often, it is not
just the fact that the offender might be seen that matters. It is that the offender
"thinks" they will be seen that can help deter the opportunity for crime.
Natural surveillance is naturally occurring. As people are moving around an
area, they will be able to observe what is going on around them, provided the
area is open and well lit. Natural surveillance is typically free of cost, but
observers may choose not to get involved in any situation that may pose a potential
threat to themselves or others. Other ways to achieve natural surveillance include
landscaping, street design, and placing high risk targets in plain view of nearby
residents, such as expensive cameras or display items near a sales clerk.
When surveillance cannot be achieved through natural means, sometimes mechanical
means, such as using close circuit television, can be used. Mechanical surveillance
employs the use of cameras, mirrors, and other equipment that allows an individual
to monitor a remote or common area. Mechanical surveillance usually involves
the purchase of moderately priced mirrors to the more expensive CCTV technology.
Once the equipment is purchased , maintenance of these devices is a long term
renewed cost as well as the organized cost of supervision. Who is watching the
cameras and how are they responding when there is an incident. CCTV is best
utilized for extraordinary behavior, not ordinary behavior. New technology is
allowing critical incidents to be observed, recorded digitally, and activate
and appropriate response.
Organized surveillance includes security patrols and other people or capable
guardians who are organized to watch a targeted area. While this is the most
effective deterrent to crime, it is also the least cost effective. While it
may be necessary to employ security patrols or off-duty police, once the patrols
are discontinued there is generally nothing left to show for your investment.
But by far the most preferable method of surveillance is natural surveillance
through good design.
2) ACCESS CONTROL
Natural access control strategies are intended to deny access to crime
targets and to create a perception of risks to offenders. Access control is
a design concept directed at reducing the opportunity and accessibility for
crime. Organized methods of access control include security guards forces. Mechanical
strategies include target hardening such as locks and card key systems. Windows
may have protective glazing that withstands blows without breaking. Doors and
window hardware may have special material and mountings which make them hard
to remove or tamper with. Walls , floors, or doors may be specially reinforced
in high security areas with materials that are difficult to penetrate. Natural
methods of access control make use of spatial definition and circulation patterns.
An example of natural design is the use of security zoning. By dividing space
into zones of differing security levels, such as unrestricted, controlled, and
restricted, sensitive areas can be more effectively protected. The focus of
access control strategies is to deny access to a crime target and create in
offenders, a perception of risk and detection, delay and response.
Effective access control is often the key to many security threats.
Access control might be strongly considered in these areas: Access control is the second principle of CPTED. Because many criminals look
for an easy escape, limiting access into an area and back out again is an effective
way to deter criminal activity. Access control can be demonstrated by having
one way into and out of a location, with devices such as a security post or
the use of mechanical gates. Others who use "alternative methods" to enter an
area look suspicious, stand out and risk detection and identification and increased
risk of apprehension. It is important to assess how the intended users are entering
the property. It is equally important to assess how others are entering the
property as well. Look at perimeter fencing for damage and cut-through's. Look
for footprints in the dirt and gravel, and wear patterns in the grassy areas.
Determining the weak points will be the first step in correcting the problem.
There are three (3) types of access control to consider: Natural (or Environmental),
Mechanical, and Organized. Natural/Environmental Access Control involves the
use of the design features and circulation patterns.To keep trespassers from
climbing over walls for instance, you could plant a hearty cactus in the area
where it will be highly visible. The use of dirt berms or large rocks can also
keep unwanted visitors from entering with a vehicle onto private property.
Mechanical Access Control includes the use of security gates, which have proven
very effective at reducing auto thefts, burglaries, and drive-by shootings.
Most perpetrators of these crimes to not want to exit the way they entered,
as it gives witnesses the opportunity to record license plates and get better
suspect information.
Organized Access Control entails the use of patrol or courtesy personnel to
control who enters the property. Distribution of parking permits affixed to
registered vehicles, will identify which vehicles belong to the residents. Enforcement
of visitor parking and towing abandoned vehicles from lots and streets improves
the image and milieu of being an environment supporting criminal activity.
Defining who uses a territory, or a place, is a major aspect of reducing crime
opportunities. Access control includes creating a sense of turf, but it focuses
on entry and exit points into buildings, parks, parking lots, and neighborhoods.
Closing some entrance ways, and opening others in strategic locations, is one
way of doing this.
Good security fencing and gates can accomplish access control. Sometimes simply
locking one door, opening another, and notifying residents of the change can
accomplish access control. In libraries and shopping mall stores, patrons are
channeled past an attendant who can observe all those who enter and exit. Sometimes
these places are equipped with electronic point of sales screening devices,
but often merely having the access point controlled can be enough. Oscar Newman
felt that apartments should channel residents through one or two common entrance
ways, so that they get to know each other and so that access is controlled.
That way intruders can more easily be identified. The same concept applies to
who residential neighborhoods where gates and street closing can similar access
control goals.
3) TERRITORIALITY
Defining who uses a territory, or a place, is a major aspect of reducing opportunities
for crime. The concept is to turn a particular area over to a legitimate users
of that place so that they will be more likely to adopt ownership over that
defined place. This will make it less likely that persons who do not belong
in place at risk will use it to commit criminal or nuisance behavior at high
risk location. These adaptive behaviors is the concept of territoriality, or
what Oscar Newman called "Defensible Space" ; reassigning physical areas so
local people can be responsible for, and control, their own public environment.
This does not automatically oust criminals, but it can render them more ineffective.
Territoriality can be accomplished by using a hierarchy of space, such as
subdividing public spaces into semi-public and semi-private spaces. For example,
a Starbuck's Coffee Shop which places chairs and tables onto the sidewalk directly
in front of their store tends to reassign this public as part of Starbuck's
territory. This can help deter loiterers from hanging in front of the store.
Similarly, symbolic property markers in the front yard of residential homes
or apartment buildings, such as short fences, hedges and plantings, pavement
stones, and front yard lighting, can demarcate the front area as belonging to
residents in the building. This can make residents feel safer when entering
or exiting their building; it can contribute to fewer burglaries, and it can
reduce the opportunity for other crimes there.
Good territoriality demonstrates a sense of "ownership", alerting potential
offenders that they don't belong there and they will be seen and reported.,
because undesirable behavior will not be tolerated. It has two (2) principle
components: Defensible Space and Maintenance.
Defensible space is divided into four (4) categories: Public, Semi-public,
Semi-private, and Private. Public areas are typically the least defensible.
A car driving on a public street would not automatically arouse suspicion. If
the street were a cul-de-sac, however this is a semipublic area. If there are
only five homes in the circle, the driver would be expected to stop at one of
the five homes or leave. Semi-private areas might include sidewalks or common
areas around residential areas. While most people may not confront a stranger
in a common area, they are likely to call the police it the person does not
appear to belong there. Private areas are different in rental communities than
in single-family home neighborhoods. In a typical apartment the private area
may not begin until you actually enter into the unit. This is especially true
if several units share a common balcony or stairways. In a single-family home
neighborhood, may owners consider their front yard to be private, or defensible
space.
There are many ways to establish defensible space. By planting low growing
hedges or bushes, you will show a defined property line. By posting signs and
stating groundrules such as "No Trespassing" or "No Soliciting," you have established
the area is defensible space and removed the excuse for non-compliance or criminal
behavior.
4) MANAGEMENT AND MAINTENANCE
One CPTED strategy that can be helpful from the small scale to the large scales
is the concept of management and maintenance. At smaller scales this means that
how property management maintains a property is instrumental in creating a sense
of place, or territory, for legitimate users of that space. If a rental property
is well maintained, it shows that management, or the owner, cares for and will
defend the property against crime and incivilities. A property that is not maintained
may indicate that the management is not concerned about the property, and might
overlook or ignore criminal activity.
Property management can be the building owners or assigned to property managers.
Some residential multi-family housing have live-in resident managers. By having
a manager live on the property they get to know intimately the problems both
inside and outside of their properties. Management policy and procedures create
the impetus to hire security patrols, have electricity bills paid so the light
will turn on, hire the trash removal company to pickup garbage from dumpsters,
pay a gardener to mow the grass and trim the overgrown landscaping. Management
is the first step in property crime prevention with the screening of tenants,
the wording and enforcement of lease agreements stating a zero tolerance drug
and crime policy, the hiring of staff, the repair of broken items.
Crime often congregates in areas where there are dilapidated and abandoned
buildings, in places where liter and graffiti are rampant, and where the area
looks as though no one cares. Further, If the property has several city code
infractions, a property manager may lose the ability to deal effectively with
criminal activity. A person facing eviction may threaten to report infractions
to the city if the manager proceeds. For example, a manager attempting to evict
a troublesome tenant, might find that person who is facing eviction may threaten
to report the infractions to the city if the manager proceeds with the eviction
process. In this case the manager may be forced to look the other way. If the
property had been maintained in a clean fashion there would be nothing to hold
against management. More importantly the property would be more likely to attract
legitimate users in the first place.
Management and maintenance go hand in hand. A property can be an award winning
design, but it no one is there to make sure that the property is maintained,
and bills get paid, and residents/tenants get screened, illegally parked cars
get towed, and bad tenants get evicted, and the lights get turned on, then the
property will quickly fall into disrepair and start attracting criminal behavior.
5) ACTIVITY SUPPORT AND GENERATORS
Activity support is a small and medium scale CPTED principle. It involves
the appropriate use of building functional spaces such as recreational facilities
and common areas. The objective with activity support is to fill the area with
legitimate users so that any abusers will leave. It may be difficult to believe
that filling an areas with legitimate users will cause the deviant users or
abusers to leave. But the opposite is also true, for if you fill an area with
deviant users, the legitimate users will withdraw.
To promote activity support utilize the common areas effectively. By incorporating
seating areas, picnic areas, porches and other amenities in open areas, the
legitimate users will participate in the normal day to day functions and maintain
ownership of the property.
Ask yourself, is that land feature or physical structure being used as it
was intended? Does the intended design fit the designated use, and if not, what
is that causing the problem? Who are the intended users? Why are the legitimate
users not using an area? Why are the criminals frequenting an area? Why is it
inviting? What will discourage them?
For example, in recreational areas and parks, the City might use proper lighting
and establish community rules to encourage the proper and safe use of facilities.
For laundry facilities, exercise rooms, and game rooms, maintaining clear visibility
and supervision by capable guardians can make sure the activities there support
the intended uses and users.
Activity support means that in urban parks you might schedule community barbecues
and sports activities to reinforce legitimate uses of the park. This can be
the case with gazebo's in the neighborhood parks, which can be placed where
drugs are sold. Scheduling legitimate activities in the gazebo can prevent this
unwanted drug or gang behavior from happening.
Activity generators are land uses or urban features that generate plenty of
local activity. They are neither positive nor negative, but they can generate
opportunities for crime if they are poorly planned or operated. For example,
they include telephone booths or automated bank machines in strip malls. Depending
on where they are placed, and when they are used, these activity generators
can cause problems. Drug dealers might use the phones for drug sales; the ATM
may be the site of robberies.
Activity generators are considered large scale since they do not operate in
isolation of the surrounding land uses. It is insufficient to place housing
to encourage activities in a commercial area, if the housing is isolated into
small pockets, without local amenities , and lacks sufficient services. People
will not place their eyes on the commercial street if they have no reason to
look outside.
On the other hand, some kids of activities, such as hot dog or flower vendors,
can provide legitimate uses and surveillance in certain areas, such as, parking
lots of football stadiums, thereby placing more eyes into the parking lot to
deter theft from cars.
Using CPTED strategies can: The CPTED process provides a holistic methodology to meet the challenges of
crime and terrorism with organizational methods(people - security staff, capable
guardians), mechanical methods (technology- hardware, barriers, hardening),
and natural design methods (architecture, design and circulation movement flow).
For example, if one of the outcomes of a threat analysis for a government
building is the challenge of a truck bomb, and the goal is to distance a potential
bomb from the building, then the CPTED approach would propose careful consideration
of:
* Where is the parking placed? The CPTED process and security threat assessment process would look at the
following high risk targets:
Engineering and back up power/ utility systems The World Trade Center and Pentagon were picked as symbolic high profile properties.
For with their destruction and the resulting impact on the stopping of air travel,
shipping and mail created the... "Day the Earth stood still."
By recognizing and identifying the threats and vulnerabilities the building
mangers and security directors and design professionals can take the necessary
action to create a safe workplace or living environment. To insure that a fully
balanced security design does not impede on the normal daily functions of the
building, a knowledgeable security consultant should be involved in the design
process using CPTED and security design strategies from the very beginning of
the design process (architectural programming).
It is primarily the client's responsibility to define the potential threats
to people , property, and information, and to determine the level and cost of
the protection that will be provided. The client may need a security specialist
to clearly define the scope of security requirements in the programming phase.
Architects worry about the fortress mentality of security professionals while
security professionals are concerned about the architect's failure to include
security elements in the design of the building from the ground up. The conflict
is not over whether to include security equipment in the building design. Rather,
the conflict lies between a building's openness on one hand and control of access
to it on the other hand.
Securing a building that was not originally planned to be secure is expensive.
Architects have to sacrifice much more of a building's openness in retrofitting
for security than they would if the facility had been designed for security
from the outset. Protection personnel and operating expenses are greater than
they need to be because of a lack of forethought during the design of the facility.
This condition is particularly evident in many of today's buildings, where modern
design and materials have resulted in facilities that are especially vulnerable.
The environmental design approach to security recognizes the space's designated
or redesignated use - which defines a solution compatible with that use. Good
security design enhances the effective use of the space at the same time prevents
crime or reduces opportunity for terrorist acts. The emphasis in environmental
security design falls on the design and use of space, a practice that deviates
from the traditional target-hardening approach to crime prevention. Traditional
target hardening focuses predominantly on denying access to a crime target through
physical or artificial barrier techniques such as locks, alarms, fences, and
gates. This traditional approach tends to overlook opportunities for natural
access control and surveillance. Sometimes the natural and normal uses of the
environment can accomplish the effects of mechanical hardening and surveillance.
Architects and designers, with the guidance of security consultant's or security
directors, can make the greatest contribution to meeting a project's security
objectives. Architects generally make the basic design decisions about circulation,
access, building materials, fenestration, and many other features that can support
or thwart overall security aims. The architect, along with the security consultant/director,
can play a vital role in designing effective natural access control, surveillance,
and territorial reinforcement strategies. Security design poses three challenges
for architects:
These examples are just a small sample of the kinds of issues and concerns
that need to be addressed by the architect based on information that the security
professional has developed. The security professional must ask the right questions
to develop security criteria. The architectural program or problem seeking stage
should incorporate the information developed from answering the six questions.
Latter the information will be passed on to the problem solution stage of architecture:
the schematic drawings, design development drawings, and construction documents.
DESIGNING FOR SECURITY IS A CPTED PROCESS
To create a security/ crime prevention through environmental design master
plan which can be incorporated into the architecture, a sequence of evaluations
should be conducted before the security system design begins. These steps are
outlined below:
Asset Definition Threat Definition Vulnerability Analysis Security Measures 1.Organizational features--policies and procedures of staff, information flow,
movement of people. The types, numbers, and deployment of security personnel
is the second choice.
2.Mechanical measures--electronic security needs, access control, surveillance
devices, technological solutions.
3.Natural features--physical barriers, circulation patterns of people, information,
and products. Natural features include basic design decisions on circulation,
access building materials, fenestration, and other design features to support
the overall security goals.
WHAT IS BEING PROTECTED
In order to provide the information in a format that the architect can work
with effectively, the security professional should identify what are the corporate
assets that are vital to protect. The three most common assets to businesses
are 1. PEOPLE, 2. INFORMATION, 3. PROPERTY.
People--One asset for protection may be the human resources. The people
needing protection may be employees, visitors, patrons, service providers, executive
VIPs. The asset of humans is protection from assault, kidnapping, murder, robbery,
terrorism. Failure to protect invited and uninvited guests on a property can
be grounds for premises liability litigation.
Information--The asset of information needs protection. Almost all
businesses have vital information that could potentially cripple or destroy
an operation. Computer records, blueprints, financial information, proprietary
secrets, personnel records, and accounting systems are the backbone of any business.
Information protection is a critical element in a security plan. Knowing who
has the information, where it is, when it is accessible, and how it could be
compromised are critical issues to be designed for.
Property--The asset of property needs protection. Property can refer
to cars on a parking lot, airplane in a hanger, or office supplies in a closet.
The threat analysis will help identify which property assets are to be protected.
The architect can then use the security requirements identified into the design
of the building, and incorporated into the whole building process.
With any of the three assets, the critical questions of a need assessment
is asking:
WHO ARE THE USERS? (visitors, staff,service crews,sales ?) The security professional will need to be clear on the implications of each
of the answers to these questions. It is recommended that a task summary can
be prepared to give to the architect. The scenario development of asking the
six key questions applies the same to a vice- president of a company or a janitorial
cleaning service. The security professional will then determine the SECURITY
IMPLICATIONS, and the DESIGN IMPLICATIONS.
Taking the example of the janitor service, the SECURITY IMPLICATIONS
might be: BASIS OF SECURITY DESIGN--3D Environmental security design or CPTED is based on three functions of human
space:
Designation--What is the purpose or intention that the space is used
for?
Site Planning- Main Lobby- Parking Garage- Loading Docks- Emergency Stairwells- Miscellaneous- Building Tenant Security- Major Systems- CPTED DESIGN GUIDELINES-
Place unsafe activities in safe areas where there is natural surveillance
and supervision- SUMMARY
As one can easily see, a lot of thought and money goes into making a building
secure. However, an architect cannot change human nature, and a lot of criminal
acts will be perpetrated in spite of the best-laid plans. Accept that our built
environment can not be defended against every potential threat. No building
security system could have prevented the act of terrorism of September 11, or
the bombing of our embassies, or courthouses. But there are many action steps
that can be taken to reduce the opportunities and fears of crime and increase
our awareness of the threats. Our goal is to design safe buildings that protect
our assets of people , information, and property.
Security systems come in many varieties, but crime is also not monolithic.
Furthermore, it is ironic that the kind of crime that most people fear is not
the kind which occurs most frequently. Stranger to stranger crimes--assault,
murder, rape and robbery--are less common than white collar crime. Most criminals
don't tote a gun. The terrorism of the 21st century will probably not be bombings,
but industrial espionage, computer pilfering and destruction of records, biological
and chemical terrorism. The greatest threat to us on a day to day basis is from
workplace violence and street crime. Designing against the threats of crime
and workplace violence is going to greatly reduce the likelihood of acts of
terrorism. It is all about controlling access and basic CPTED principles. Even
terrorists have to make our buildings and assets accessible.
Architecture is one of the least used pieces of the security puzzle to make
out public and private buildings safe and secure. CPTED and Defensible Space
planning create the environment for better security by allowing natural surveillance
and unobstructed visibility, controlling access to persons who belong on the
property, preventing unauthorized access of persons onto the property, integrating
the security technology into functional design and architecture, allowing the
legitimate building users to be your capable guardians for legitimate activity
and deterrence of criminal activity.
Finally, environmental design can never eliminate crime completely because
it does not attack root causes. Architectural security design may only be responsible
for shifting the places where crime occurs. It remains easier to make a building
secure than provide jobs for teenagers. Yet, environmental control does go a
long way toward making people feel better about their work and living environment,
and that empowers people to act n a safer manor.
Architects and security professionals should avoid worry over events that
they have no control over. Save your worry for that which you can control: good
design, integrated security systems, competent training and staff, and keeping
a watchful eye on your workplaces, living environments and residences.
Architectural Record. October , 2001. Pp. 24-26
Atlas, Randall. "Just when you thought it was safe to go back in the building."
Security Management, August 1998
Crowe, Tim. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design 2nd edition( Boston:
Butterworth - Heinman, 2000.
Environmental Design Technical Group News, EDRA. September 2001.
Newman, Oscar. Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design. New
York: MacMillan , 1973.
Security Watch, Bureau of Business Practice Newsletter, Oct. 2001, p.4
Werkerle, Gerda and Whitzman, Carolyn. Safe Cities: Guidelines for Planning,
Design and Management. New York:Van Norstrand, 1995.
BIO: RANDALL I. ATLAS Ph.D.,AIA,CPP
Randall Atlas is President of Counter Terror Design Inc., and vice-president
of Atlas Safety & Security Design Inc., in Miami , Florida. He is a registered
architect in Florida and nationally accredited with N.C.A.R.B., and a certified
protection professional (CPP) from the American Society of Industrial Security,
and member of the ASIS Security Architecture and Engineering Committee, and
received his doctorate of criminology from Florida State University. Dr. Atlas
is a nationally recognized trainer and author on Crime Prevention Through Environmental
Design (CPTED) for the National Crime Prevention Institute, the American Society
of Industrial Security, and the American Institute of Architects. Dr. Atlas
has been appointed to the Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute of the Prevention
of Terrorism peer review panel. Dr. Atlas is a technical assistance consultant
for U.S. HUD and has conducted CPTED surveys for housing projects around the
country. He is a regular contributor to the Protection of Assets Manual, Access
Control Magazine, Security Technology Magazine, and Security Management Magazine.
For more information go to http://www.cpted-security.com or http://www.counterterrordesign.com
Atlas Safety & Security Design, Inc.
Miami, Florida
2) natural surveillance;
3) territorial reinforcement;
4) maintenance ;
5) management strategies
* all entrances and exits to the site and building
* internal access points in restricted or controlled areas
* environmental and building features used to gain access
(trees, ledges, skylights, balconies, windows, tunnels)
* security screening devices (guard stations, surveillance, identification equipment)
a) increase the effort needed to commit a crime or act of terrorism;
b) increase the risks of being detection and punishment associated with
a crime or act of terrorism;
c) reduce the rewards associated with committing the crime or act of terrorism;
d) and remove the excuses why people do not comply with the rules and
engage in inappropriate behavior that lead to crime or acts of terror.
* How does service delivery get screened and controlled?
* How do pedestrians flow into the building?
* How many entrances are there for the public, staff, and service?
* Is there one main entrance for the public?
* How much distance is the exterior path of travel from the street , pedestrian
plaza, to the building facade?
* Do all four facades have setbacks from the street?
* What is the most appropriate bollard system or vehicular barrier system?
* Does bollards or planters create blind spots or sleeping places for homeless
persons and street criminals?
* Does the threat exist from bicycles and motorcycles bombers, thus requiring a
smaller net?
* Does surveillance from the building to the street remain unobstructed?
* Does landscaping and plantings remain unobstructed?
* Do barriers hinder accessibility by persons with disabilities?
* Where do private or public security forces patrol?
* Are security patrol patterns unobstructed and verified with a guardtour system?
* Is the structure of the building designed with structural redundancy?
* Does the building become a less appealing target by layers of buffer zones that
make it more difficult for an intruder to reach the intended target?
* Has the structural components been designed to allow the decompression effects
of an explosion?
* Are the window systems designed to protect against the threat of broken glass
by using window film Mylar coatings, blast curtains, or blast resistant glazing
materials?
* Does lighting around the property provide a uniform level of light to resist
shadows or hiding places?
* Is there CCTV in places of extra ordinary activity to detect inappropriate behavior
and record and monitor that activity?
* Does the building have a consistent and comprehensive weapon screening program
for the building users, staff, and packages and mail?
* Does the property use security layering to create a sense of boundary of the
property(site), the building, and specific points within the building?
* Does management and maintenance practices and policies support security operations
, the use of security staff, monitoring devices, weapon screening procedures for
people and property, screening of employees backgrounds, and physical upkeep of
the premises?
Mechanical, Ventilation and water treatment systems
Communications systems including the computer facilities
Supply and storage areas, including loading and receiving docks , warehouses,
volatile substances or materials storage.
Transportation facilities that include rail, bus, train, seaports, and
airports.
Human targets which can include political figures or CEO's, or casual
observers to impact collateral damage such as school children or shoppers.
Government or military facilities
Once the security concerns are identified by the client and security professional,
the security system is designed to implement those objectives. With the proliferation
of security devices, along with rapid advances in system technology, security
planning requires specialists with a working knowledge of these technologies.
Yet, architects also must have a basic understanding of the principles of application
and operation of security technology as well as an appreciation of the basic
tenets of effective security programming. Any building must meet specific functional
criteria, and from the function the design evolves. A building must permit efficient
job performance, meet the needs of the user, and protect the user from safety
hazards and criminal acts that affect the production and service delivery of
the building's users.
1. a sign-in desk for the service trades
2. design access control system to allow staff to control entry and log
in movement
3. placement of garbage dumpsters
4. location of service elevator
5. location of service doors
6. alarm systems for offices and control room tie-in and deactivation.
7. placements of ventilation intake grills and utilities
What are the vital assets--people, information, property? What are the most
important assets? What are the secondary assets? What level of protection is
needed for each area?
What are the threats to each asset? Who are you protecting? Could threats be
vandalism, espionage, burglary, theft, assault, sabotage, robbery? How would
threats be accomplished? When? Why? By whom? Where? What kind of attack or approach
might be used to fit to the target? Are the threats highly probable, possible,
or unlikely?
Are the threats real or perceived? Compare the costs for the protection of each
asset group with the cost of potential loss. Compare different kinds of security
measures possible for protection of the assets.
There are three types of security measures available as a choice:
WHAT CAN THE USERS DO IN THE BUILDING? (tasks,rec,work)
WHY ARE THE PARTICULAR USERS THERE? (official business,guests)
WHEN DO THE USERS GET THERE AND LEAVE? (time, shift,patterns)
WHERE CAN USERS GO TO IN THE BUILDING? (horizontal,vertical circulation)
HOW CAN THE USERS GET THERE? (access control methods,circulation)
1. control of after hour access
2. verification of cleaning employee status
3. security manpower to sign in and supervise entry and exit
4. key control
The crime prevention through environmental design approach (CPTED) recognizes
the building environments' designated or redesignated use. The emphasis of security
design falls on the design and use of space. This is a practice that is different
from the traditional target hardening approach to crime prevention. Traditional
target hardening, or fortressing, focuses predominately on denying access to
a crime target through physical or artificial barrier techniques such as locks,
alarms, fences, and gates. The traditional approach tends to overlook opportunities
for natural access control and surveillance. Sometimes the natural and normal
uses of the environment can accomplish the same effects of mechanical target
hardening, fortressing, and mechanical surveillance.
Definition--How is the space defined? What are the social, cultural,
legal, psychological ways the space is defined?
Design--Is the space defined to support prescribed or intended behaviors?
CPTED security design process is applied on a macro to micro level. The three
levels are site security design, building perimeter, and inner building space
or point protection. Electronic intrusion detection, perimeter protection, and
access control techniques must be elements in a total security system and design
approach. Each technique has distinct technological and operational characteristics,
and environmental reactions, along with differing requirements for installation
and maintenance. In order to determine what security technology is the most
cost effective and appropriate the following questions should be answered by
the owner, architect, and competent security consultant:
ISSUES THAT THE ARCHITECT SHOULD ADDRESS WITH THE SECURITY CONSULTANT
Access-
Service delivery-
Circulation patterns-
Lighting quality and quantity-
Perimeter defense
Visitor control issues-
Building fire system location-
Reception/guard kiosk design and equipment provisions-
Architectural security barrier design--turnstiles, glass enclosures, reception
areas, etc.-
Retail tenant security adjacent to lobby areas-
Development of unobtrusive CCTV surveillance-
Controlling access into emergency stairwells adjacent to the main lobby-
After-hours access control into the main lobby-
Alarm monitoring of perimeter doors-
Main lobby lighting
Valet or self parking-
Public, private, or mixed use-
Segregated parking levels-
Executive parking security-
Need for and use of CCTV surveillance system, emergency signaling system, intercom
system, and guard tour system-
Lighting issues, including type of lighting and number of footcandles to be
provided
Amount of vehicular traffic flow expected-
Impact, if any, on street traffic or pedestrian walkways-
Storage of package and materials-
Distribution of deliveries throughout the building -
Development of necessary CCTV surveillance and intercom systems-
Provision of remote door release controls
Restricting access or allowing use by the public for interfloor traffic-
Communication provisions in stairwells-
Emergency exit alarm devices on doors-
Alarm monitoring of the stairwells-
Access control into and out of the stairwells
Elevator bank access control and architectural design-
Communication provisions in elevator vestibules on individual floors-
Public washrooms-
Mail services-
Deliveries-
Security in mechanical areas-
Door hardware for telephone, electrical, and storage closets-
Security for fuel and water storage areas-
Roof access-
Tunnel or skyway connections to other nearby buildings-
Plaza security--issues related to landscaping, lighting, and use of unobtrusive
surveillance systems-
Elevator cab communication devices
A comprehensive access control program to encompass elevator car access control
requirements and individual floor access control measures-
Security measures for individual departments and operations that may have additional
security requirements-
Executive floor security-
Receptionist workstations-
Boardroom or executive conference room access control issues-
Vestibule construction of freight elevator lobbies-
Console room design-
Secured storage areas, vaults, and safes within tenant space-
Closet space for security-related equipment-
HVAC and power requirements for security operations
Fire and life safety-
Public address-
CCTV surveillance-
Access control-
Alarm monitoring-
Radio communication-
Emergency signaling-
Intercom-
Guard tour-
Door control-
Uninterruptible power supply
Design the exterior of a structure so it is hard to climb-
Minimize the number of exterior openings at or below grade-
Protect all building openings against entry or attack-
Provide for extra conduit for growth and changes-
Design walls to resist penetration by intruders possibly using cars, hand tools,
explosion,
etc.-
Provide sufficient space in the lobby or entry areas for verification, identification,
and
screening of users, i.e. sign-in desks, contraband detection equipment such
as X-ray
machines, and personal identification equipment.-
Provide adequate space for maintaining security equipment.-
Protect all utilities and control panels from disruption by unauthorized persons.-
Design elevators, stairways, and automated locking mechanisms not to compromise
security
during emergency evacuations.-
Design lighting for proper illumination in coordination with CCTV--reduce glare,
increase
view of field.-
Design perimeter to be well defined and supported by natural barriers such as
landscaping,
mechanical barriers such as walls, fences, buried sensors, motion sensors, proximity
sensors,
and by organizational methods such as guard patrol.
REFERENCES